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As for the pure philosophical ‘freedom of the will’ my will is as free as I
feel it to be and there is an end to the matter.
– R.B. Braithwaite.1
!ere is a widespread tendency in the philosophy of our times to ‘get back 
to basics’. In the wake of philosophical reconstruction workers such as 
G.E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein, and the ordinary language phi-
losophy they inspired, contemporary philosophers appear to have learned 
some important lessons: to take into account our most commonsensi-
cal notions about ourselves, each other, and the world we live in, and to 
beware of framing elaborate problems in theory where practically there 
are none. !e result of such a common sense mentality is not only that 
our ordinary phenomenological apprehensions of life in general are taken 
seriously – as they should be, if philosophy is to make sense of the world 
we live in – but also that certain assumptions about our self-experience 
are allowed to go unquestioned. !us we see that in many philosophi-
cal texts, especially those discussing free will, consciousness, agency, and 
deliberative awareness, a speci"c phenomenological2 account of the self 
is presupposed: namely, the self as a "xed entity, a uni"ed centre of con-
sciousness, which focuses its intentions into actions, and hence experiences 
itself as the source of its actions.  Such conceptions are usually based on 
philosophers’ armchair introspection, yet they are deemed to be universal 
among mankind, an undeniable part of our most basic experience and 
common sense. Indeed, what can be more commonsensical than that we 
experience ourselves as selves?
 I intend to question this assumption, particularly in the context of the 
free will debate. I do believe that such a perception of the self may arise 
when we put on our ‘introspectacles’: that is, when we are consciously 
thinking or talking about ourselves, and when we philosophically focus on 
‘the self itself ’. However, I do not believe that it is warranted on the mere 
basis of such introspection to infer that this is how we usually experience 
ourselves. Could it not be the case that the often-reported experience of the 
‘self ’ and some of its attributes is a result of focused introspection, rather 
than an expression of our default self-experience? Perhaps the experienced 
‘self ’ prior to introspection encompasses a wider and more dynamic back-
ground of conscious, semi-conscious and preconscious aspects, while 
introspection focuses on what is at the foreground of our minds, and trans-
lates this into the experience of a consciously willing self.
 !is paper will focus on the nature of the introspective move itself, 
on the interpretation that may be implicit in such a moment of ‘looking 
into oneself ’. !e main question to be answered is as follows: is the ‘self ’ 
we encounter in introspection phenomenologically identical to how we 
usually experience ourselves? In what follows I will "rst of all survey the 
predominance of this ‘introspective self ’ in the free will debate, and brie#y 
discuss some previous criticisms of philosophers’ use of phenomenology, 
in order to prepare a deeper critique of introspection. Second, I will try to 
expose several problems stemming from the nature of introspection itself, 
and argue that it is at least possible for the ‘introspective self ’ to di$er from 
the default ‘experiential self ’. !ird, I will – perhaps paradoxically – call 
on introspection for evidence that such a divergence between introspected 
and experienced selves is phenomenologically plausible, since a di$erent 
kind of introspection may lead to di$erent introspective results. To eluci-
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date this ‘introspective argument against introspection’ I will introduce the 
concepts of a foreground and background of the experience of conscious-
ness. Finally, I will conclude that it is time to further problematise the use 
of introspection in philosophy, and brie#y consider the implications of 
these arguments for the free will debate. 
1. !e ‘Phenomenal Fact’
While there is no scarcity of phenomenological universals3 concerning the 
nature of the self in any type of philosophy, it is in the context of the free 
will debate that they make their most prominent appearance. !e free will 
problem can be construed as ‘an unexplained gap between the category of 
physical phenomena and the category of subjective phenomena’ (Libet, 
1999: 55) – that is, as a discrepancy between the implausibility of men-
tal causation (i.e. that our mental states can cause physical events – see 
Hohwy below) from a metaphysical point of view, on the one hand, and 
our experience of ourselves as conscious agents, on the other.4 To put it 
more bluntly: philosophy may tell us we are not free, but ‘we’ feel we are. 
Solutions to the problem usually consist of either an attempt to bridge 
the metaphysical-experiential gap, or an e$ort to show that one of the 
two con#icting terms should be prioritised. Either way, the notion of a 
unitary, consciously acting self is invoked by many proponents of mental 
causation in order to voice an innermost experience, to which we all are 
supposed to be committed. At the same time, this notion is taken seriously 
by opponents of mental causation, who likewise consider it a basic part of 
our experience, be it one that must be explained away. Both sides of the 
debate, then, broadly seem to agree that the introspective experience of 
the acting self is a hard ‘phenomenal fact’ (to borrow a phrase from Libet, 
below), yet they di$er in the value they assign to it: whether as a piece of 
‘prima facie evidence’, or as an illusion that should not be given philo-
sophical credence.5 
 Consider the appearance of this ‘phenomenal fact’ in a variety of 
papers (I have highlighted the universalising tendencies in bold):
‘[...] we must recognize that the almost universal experience that we 
can act with a free, independent choice provides a kind of prima facie 
evidence that conscious mental processes can causatively control some 
brain processes [...] !e phenomenal fact is that most of us feel that we 
do have free will [...]’ (Libet, 1999: 56).
‘[...] the agency theory is appealing because it captures the way we 
experience our own activity. It does not seem to me (at least ordinarily) 
that I am caused to act by the reasons which favour doing so; it seems 
to be the case, rather, that I produce my own decisions in view of those 
reasons [...]’ (O’Conner, 1995: 196).
‘[...] your phenomenology presents your own behavior to you as having 
yourself as its source, rather than (say) presenting your own behaviour 
to you as having your own occurrent mental events as its source [...]’ 
(Horgan et al., quoted in Nahmias et al., 2004: 167).
‘Many people, including most philosophers, have a very "rm belief 
that there is mental causation, that is, that mental states such as beliefs, 
desires, intentions, and emotions are e%cacious [...] in the causing of 
some physical events such as bodily movements and actions in the wider 
sense [...] We thus have a very deep attachment to mental causation’ 
(Hohwy, 2004: 377).
‘[...] it seems to each of us that we have conscious will. It seems we have 
selves. It seems we have minds. It seems we are agents. It seems we cause 
what we do’ (Wegner, 2002: 342).
‘Human freedom is just a fact of experience. [...] a series of powerful 
arguments based on facts of our own experience inclines us to the 
conclusion that there must be some freedom of the will because we all 
experience it all the time’ (Searle, 1984: 88).
What emerges from an overview of such ‘low-brow’ accounts of phe-
nomenology – and many other examples can be found – is an informal 
8Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy Mara van der Lugt | !e Foreground and Background of Consciousness
yet introspectively plausible sketch of the thinking, willing, acting self. 
!e ‘actish phenomenal quality’ (Ginet, 1990: 13) at the source of these 
introspective musings springs from individual philosophers, yet their con-
clusions are universalised in a subtle move from ‘I’ to ‘we’, ‘each of us’ or 
‘most of us’.
 Such practices of introspection or "rst-person phenomenology have 
been subjected to a variety of criticisms in the past decades, which in 
turn have given rise to new methods and versions of phenomenological 
investigations. For instance, Eddy Nahmias et al. have criticised the ‘uni-
versality assumption’ of free will philosophers who believe their own (often 
mutually incompatible) introspective reports are indicative of the human 
condition in general (2004: 164). Instead, the authors propose ‘systematic 
psychological research on the relevant experiences of non-philosophers’ 
(169) – that is, they attempt to gain insight to lay phenomenology through 
a series of empirical queries, and conclude that the ‘universality assump-
tion’ is often wrong. Philosophers usually ‘introspect through the lens of 
their theoretical commitments’ and are therefore ‘the wrong subjects to 
trust’ (163). 
 Daniel Dennett appears to be expressing a similar concern in his 
critique of ‘the !rst-person-plural presumption’: when thinking about 
consciousness, ‘I’ is often widened into ‘we’ (1991: 67). Not only is this 
presumption unwarranted, says Dennett, but our very notion of infalli-
ble introspection is a mistake: ‘I suspect that when we claim to be just 
using our powers of inner observation, we are always actually engaging in a 
sort of impromptu theorizing [...]’ (Ibid.). !ere is no way of eliminating 
interpretation from such observation – thus all (not just philosophical) 
introspection is suspect. Yet Dennett does believe it possible to construct 
an objective method of phenomenology, which avoids the temptations of 
"rst-person introspection without sliding into a fully reductive behaviour-
ism that forbids any talk of mental events. !is ‘heterophenomenology’ 
describes subjects’ reports in the scienti"c third-person perspective, and 
treats the reported intentional objects like "ctional entities, which may or 
may not be real (Ibid.: 71-98).
 !ese alternative methods of phenomenology, and others of the sort, 
share common ground in that they question the salience of individual 
introspection and tend towards a broader scienti"c survey of human expe-
rience. Herein lies an important insight. Yet these methods do nothing 
to answer my question about what happens in the introspective move: 
they criticise phenomenological claims just with respect to their univer-
salisation of introspection, not with respect to introspection itself. !e 
more fundamental question about introspection, I would argue, cannot be 
evaded, even by Nahmias and Dennett. If we want to avoid radical behav-
iourism and be able to say anything about consciousness or experience, 
as both authors do, somewhere along the line someone has to introspect 
– whether it be the philosopher or the subjects of an experiment. !e Nah-
mias queries, though distanced from philosophers’ introspection, remain 
dependent on the lay subjects’ introspection. Dennett’s heterophenom-
enologist is merely re-describing the "rst-person experiences of the subject 
into a third-person theory. (!e scientist who notes that ‘subject S reports 
having an experience E’ may not have to introspect personally, yet still 
relies on S introspecting and commenting on E.) Either way, empirical 
queries of phenomenology cannot entirely steer clear of the "rst-person 
perspective. Hence, the ‘deeper’ question concerning introspection has not 
yet been answered. On the contrary – it has not even been posed. 
2. !e Phenomenological Fallacy
!e deeper problem, remember, is whether introspection adequately rep-
resents our common experience of ourselves to ourselves. To argue that 
such an assumption of adequacy is at least mildly suspicious and perhaps 
even highly problematic, I will make two remarks – one might call them 
premises – on which to build my case. Since my argument is designed 
to make a general point, it should not depend on a speci"c theory of 
either phenomenology or introspection, and I do not want to commit to 
one. I will therefore not introduce detailed theoretical and methodological 
underpinnings of the topics in question, and merely outline some points 
that should be relatively modest and uncontroversial. 
 !e "rst point should be clear from the discussion above: phenom-
enology is not like most ‘normal’ sciences. It has for its subject matter not 
the outer world as it is, but as it appears to the inner world. As the case of 
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Dennett shows, even if we aspire to objectively describe the phenomenon, 
in phenomenology we are ultimately bound to some kind of subjective 
experience: to the "rst-person perspective. If phenomenology wants to 
investigate consciousness and experience – what it is like to be or see or feel 
something – it has to rely on the ‘inner take’ on things. It cannot naively 
fall back on the scienti"c ‘outer take’ without forfeiting the project itself, 
as is the common tendency in behaviourism. Phenomenology without a 
view from the inside, I would argue, is not phenomenology at all.
 !e basic subjective commitment of phenomenology opens a realm 
of possibilities as well as problems of its own. For even if it is agreed that 
we cannot access subjective experience from the outside without losing 
an essential part of this experience (the ‘what it is like’-ness) – how do we 
know we can do justice to the experience while describing it from the inside 
out? 
 !is is where introspection comes in, and it brings us to the sec-
ond point: introspection is not like ‘normal’ perception or observation. 
!e subject-object vocabulary that makes sense when we are discussing 
our perception of things becomes problematic in introspective contexts, 
where the phenomenon seems to be observing itself. According to a ‘direct 
access’ (or ‘unmediated observation’) model of introspection, this lack of 
di$erential distance between subject and object is precisely what endows 
introspection with an immediate and infallible source of knowledge.6 Fol-
lowing the footsteps of Descartes (and perhaps Husserl), one might posit 
the absolute transparency of the self, and infer from this that the most 
certain knowledge can be derived from introspection.  
 I believe this model of introspection is the only one that is fundamen-
tally incompatible with my argument below. Since it is widely discredited, 
I will permit myself to dismiss it on two grounds. First, there appear to be 
no solid arguments for the notion of introspective self-transparency except 
perhaps the ‘prima facie evidence’ of introspection itself – which is exactly 
where the problem lies. Second, starting from the premise that there is 
no subject-object di$erentiation in introspection as there is in perception, 
one could argue in either of two ways. One might follow the direct access 
model in arguing that, wherever subject and object are the same, there is 
an immediate and therefore certain route to knowledge. But one could 
just as well take the opposite direction, and argue that where there is no 
separate object, there is no objectivity, and so the absence of distance is 
precisely what makes introspection problematic where perception is not.7 
It is this second line of reasoning that I would like to pursue a bit further.
 It is possible to argue for any kind of observation that the act of look-
ing changes the object observed. !is worry could arise at di$erent levels: 
in the Kantian consideration that we can never experience the Ding an sich, 
the thing-in-itself that is out of reach of the senses; or in the more trivial 
notion that we only ever see the world through our own eyes. It rises in a 
di$erent way in quantum physics: for instance, in Schrödinger’s ‘cat in the 
box’- scenario, where it is the very act of looking that determines whether 
the cat is dead or alive. We could argue, along the transparency-line, that 
the absence of a basic subject-object distinction makes introspection 
immune from worries of this kind. Yet we could also argue that the worry 
becomes more fundamental in this context, as the act of introspection may 
set up a new and more problematic subject-object distance within the self: 
i.e. the observing-self (subject) versus the self-observed (object). !e clas-
sic dilemma is whether introspection works through a kind of immediate 
transparency, or whether it creates a self-as-object that is somehow di$er-
ent from the self-as-subject of our experience.
 I do not believe this problem can be solved a priori – if it can be solved 
at all. Fortunately, I do not need to solve it to be able to draw the following 
conclusion: it is at the very least conceptually and metaphysically possi-
ble that introspection is not immediate, but is itself a kind of mediation. 
!is possibility is all that is required to present some of the free will phi-
losophers quoted above with the following objection: that they implicitly 
and unwarrantedly assume that their phenomenology and introspection 
are somehow immediate and therefore constitute a kind of ‘prima facie 
evidence’ to support conclusions about a variety of mental phenomena. I 
call this the ‘phenomenological fallacy’: it consists mainly of speaking too 
easily of ‘phenomenal facts’. Considering the possibility of introspective 
mediation, such implicit trust in active introspection may be dangerous 
as well as unwarranted. Again, the question must be asked whether the 
introspected self does justice to the full range of our self-experience. 
 Here the reader might tug my sleeve, as I appear to be sliding into 
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dangerous territory. Surely I am not positing an experienced self versus a 
real self – or, to speak in Kantian terms, a phenomenal versus a noume-
nal self (the self ‘an sich’)? On the contrary. I would like to consider the 
possibility of two levels of ‘phenomenal’ selves: the self as we encounter 
it in introspection proper, as opposed to the way we usually experience 
ourselves. I am interested not in how the self really is – after all, there is 
not much we can say about that – but in how it usually is experienced, 
when we are not actively, philosophically, introspecting.8 !at it is possible 
for the introspective and experiential self to come apart may not seem 
intuitively plausible at "rst. Yet I believe it is possible to realise through 
introspection itself how introspection may distort our self-experience. !is 
may seem paradoxical, but it is also unavoidable. !at is: we cannot pro-
ceed much further here by way of mere argument. Beyond the possibility 
of mediation mentioned above, we have come to the limits of what we can 
say about the nature of introspection without invoking some kind of intro-
spection itself. In other words, it is time either to be silent or to introspect. 
I believe it is worth exploring the second option. 
3. !e Introspective Argument Against Introspection
Let’s take a step backwards. Perhaps we can reconstruct the introspective 
technique on which the ‘common sense’ phenomenology of the self and 
the will is based – the kind that I suspect lies at the heart of the phenom-
enological fallacy – as follows: 
[INTROSPECTION 1]: Look into yourself. What do you see? You 
see and feel yourself as an entity of a certain character, with a 
speci"c set of desires and beliefs, an irreducible ‘I’ that is separate 
from the world. Based on what you want to do and what you 
think is best to do, you make certain decisions, and realise your 
intentions into actions. Doing so, you have a ‘feeling of doing’: 
you are aware that you have consciously willed these actions, and 
hence you experience yourself as an agent. Look back at your past 
actions: usually, when you did something, you intended to do it 
and then did it. Look forward to your future actions: nothing 
is stronger than the feeling that it will be you who is acting, not 
merely your body or your brain. Raise your right hand. Did you 
not feel it was you who raised it?
Is this an exaggeration? If it is, it is not meant to be. In the context of this 
paper, one may already be inclined to take a critical stance to such a leading 
introspective exercise. But introduced and worded in the right way, such 
invocations of ‘low brow’ introspection can have a strong intuitive appeal. 
To me personally, at least at "rst sight, the results of [INTROSPECTION 1] 
seem quite convincing. In the light of actions performed, it seems only 
natural to think of my agency along the lines of willing-doing: I wanted to 
go for a walk in the evening, so I decided to do it, and then I did it. !ink-
ing of the future, I can already frame intentions in my mind that will lead 
to the actions intended. Most strikingly, any version of the hand-example 
can have the common sense plausibility of Moore’s paradigmatic ‘Here is 
one hand’- approach.9 When I introspect while observing my hand and 
deciding whether or not to raise it, and then raising it, there does seem to 
be a ‘free-willish’ feeling of doing accompanying my movement. Nothing 
seems more plausible than to say that this is a hand, and this is me raising 
it.  
 In themselves, I believe auto-experiments of this kind, in their appeal 
to common sense experience, are based on a good hunch, a healthy philo-
sophical instinct. But they fail here, since common sense is precisely what 
is at stake: what is our everyday, pre-theoretical experience of ourselves and 
our actions? What if the kind of self-re#ection invoked in [INTROSPEC-
TION 1] is already an interpretation? Here we would do well to remember 
Wittgenstein’s criticism of Moore’s commonsensical examples: when phi-
losophers say things like ‘I am certain here is a hand’ or ‘that is a tree’, they 
are already far removed from ordinary language and everyday cases (Witt-
genstein, 1969/1975). Similarly, there is no ordinary context in which we 
would express our conviction that ‘I feel it is I who raise my hand’, or ‘I 
experience a self ’, or even ‘I have a feeling of doing’. When such things are 
uttered, we are already deep in theory. Indeed, common sense fails more 
dramatically here, since it is possible to identify a hand by pointing at it, 
but it is not possible to simply point at a self or a will.
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 I think it is relatively easy to discredit [INTROSPECTION 1] as it stands, 
simply by taking a second look and daring to question its results and asser-
tions. When we are consciously focusing our gaze upon our hand and 
thinking of raising it, there will indeed be a ‘self-centred’ feeling of doing. 
But in normal cases when we are raising a hand, whether to grab something 
or ask a question or shake another hand, is there a corresponding feeling of 
deliberate doing – an experience, as Daniel Wegner (2002) would put it, 
of conscious will? Similarly, in the course of our everyday actions, are we 
usually actively deliberating and deciding about what to do before doing 
it? Are we usually present in our actions in the way that [INTROSPECTION 
1] suggests we are – as consciously wanting, willing, doing selves? For my 
part, when I reconsider my daily dealings in the world, I think the answer 
to these questions should be no. 
 To look at a concrete case, let’s consider the action of taking a shower. 
Wegner uses this example in order to argue that an action cannot qualify 
as ‘truly willed’ (Wegner, 2002: 3) unless it was accompanied by an experi-
ence of conscious will: 
‘If a person plans to take a shower, for example, and says that she intends 
to do it as she climbs into the water, spends "fteen minutes in there 
scrubbing up nicely, and then comes out reporting that she indeed seems 
to have had a shower but does not feel she had consciously willed it – who 
are we to say that she did will it? Consciously willing an action requires a 
feeling of doing […], a kind of internal “oomph” that somehow certi"es 
authentically that one has done the action. If she didn’t get that feeling 
about her showering, then there’s no way we could establish for sure 
whether she consciously willed it’ (Ibid.: 4).
Something appears to have gone wrong here: not just in the notion that 
it would be natural for us to experience an activity such as showering as 
consciously willed, and that something important would be missing in 
the absence of this experience – but in the underlying assumption that it 
‘usually seems that we consciously will our voluntary actions’, even if ‘this is an 
illusion’ (Ibid.: chapter 1, subheading).10 On the basis of [INTROSPECTION 
1], this assumption would indeed seem to be warranted – but is it really?
 
 We could in fact describe the phenomenology of showering in wholly 
di$erent terms. Speaking for myself, my voluntary showers are not usually 
preceded by a conscious and deliberate decision, let alone accompanied 
by an experience of will. Most of the time I don’t actively decide to take a 
shower – I just do it. If asked later what I had been doing, I would say ‘I 
took a shower’. If asked why, I might say something along the lines of ‘I 
felt like taking one’. If quizzed by a philosopher, I would indeed explicate 
that ‘I consciously decided to take a shower’, and that it was an act of will. 
But this does not mean that at the moment of showering itself, I had any 
experience of conscious will at all. On the contrary: as long as I’m not 
employing a version of [INTROSPECTION 1] in the course of the shower, 
it’s usually a rather passive experience, during which fragments of thoughts 
and sense input drift in and out of awareness. On the whole, there seems 
to be no question of a conscious will or decisive self – no ‘I’ at all – just the 
experience of showering. 
 !is may also have been what Jean-Paul Sartre had in mind with his 
notion of the ‘transcendence of the ego’. Consider the following example, 
as worded by Jones & Fogelin (1997):
‘When I am intensely interested in what I am doing – say, in reading an 
exciting novel – I never think of myself as reading; I am fully occupied 
with the narrative. But if, after I have put the book aside, someone asks 
me what I have been doing, I reply without hesitation, ‘I was reading a 
book.’ Where does this knowledge come from? Careful introspection 
reveals that no ‘I’ was actually present in my consciousness while I was 
reading the book. Nevertheless I now know that at that time I was 
reading. Further, the ‘I’ that is so seldom present is always available, on 
call. !is too is shown by introspection: I can at any time recall either 
what I experienced on a particular occasion in the past or the fact that it 
was I who experienced it’ (371).
Like the shower scenario, this example demonstrates that a di$erent mode 
of ‘careful’ introspection, or introspection at second sight, can amount to 
a di$erent kind of self-experience. For lack of a better term, let’s call this 
alternative mode of access to ourselves [INTROSPECTION 2]. Using this 
mode, it seems to be the case for most voluntary activities – at least, for 
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most of mine – that we can describe them in di$erent terms from our 
customary self-reports.11 In other words, a careful comparative [INTRO-
SPECTION 2] can be wielded to produce a di$erent self-experience than 
that which results from [INTROSPECTION 1]. !is suggests, somewhat par-
adoxically, that our most commonsensical introspective self-descriptions 
(‘I read a book’, ‘I wanted to read a book’) do not necessarily correspond 
to our ordinary default self-experience. And that, in a nutshell, is the 
introspective argument against introspection: philosophers may appeal to 
introspection in support of a certain notion of self-experience – yet it is 
introspection itself that can show us that introspection can distort.  
Foreground, Background
At this point it may be helpful to introduce the concepts of a foreground 
and background of experience. I suggest that we may speak of the fore-
ground when we are consciously paying attention or thinking about 
something, and when we are consciously deliberating or deciding. It is 
here that we may encounter an inner voice, a conscious will, and a centred 
self. All the rest is in the background, which can perhaps be conceived as 
a dynamic, multi-faceted, often fuzzy web of semiconscious and possibly 
preconscious footage at the rim of our awareness. Here we may "nd half-
digested thoughts, emotions, intuitions, perceptions, and even actions: 
things that are not interpreted by the foreground, but are nevertheless part 
of our experience, and can be stored for future use.12 
 It should be noted that this schematic distinction between a foreground 
and a background is not meant to correspond to the dichotomy of conscious 
versus unconscious or automatic behaviour, which is often presupposed by 
philosophers, psychologists and scientists alike. For instance, psychologists 
such as Bargh & Chartrand (1999) discuss an array of empirical evidence 
to argue that ‘most of our day-to-day actions, motivations, judgments, and 
emotions are not the products of conscious choice and guidance’, but are 
‘driven by automatic, nonconscious mental processes’ – indeed, ‘it appears 
impossible, from these "ndings, that conscious control could be up to 
the job’ (464-5). Underlying their thesis is a clear-cut distinction between 
conscious processes on the one hand, which are associated with awareness, 
intent, e$ort and control, and nonconscious processes or automatisms on 
the other (463). To me, such a black-and-white distinction of conscious 
control versus nonconscious automatism seems deeply #awed, as it over-
looks the wide grey zone of pre- and semiconscious aspects of experience.13 
Consequently, it makes the primacy of the nonconscious seem counter-
intuitive, as it stipulates that such processes pass outside the reach of our 
experience, awareness and agency.
 !is does not have to be the case. What the concept of a background 
may help us to grasp intuitively, is that even if an action is not actively, 
consciously willed, this does not mean it is not part of our awareness, 
our experience – of who we are. !e boundaries between foreground and 
background should be visualised as always #owing, shifting, oscillat-
ing, #uctuating: whether continuously, as in James’ concept of a ‘river’ 
or ‘stream’ of consciousness (1890/1950: 239), or discontinuously, ‘con-
stantly broken by detours – by blows – "ssures – white noise’ (Strawson, 
2003: 356). !e di$erence between the grounds is gradual, dynamic, and 
unstable: what is now in the foreground may merge into the background 
before we know it, and bits and pieces of the background may pop up 
into the foreground and evaporate again in the blink of an eye.14 Actions 
may #ow from the background as well as the foreground, and this does 
not disqualify either kind from being rightly attributed to our (possibly 
retrospective) sense of agency. 
 Hence, I do not deny that the foreground is a real and important 
part of our experience. Indeed, it could be argued that our most essential 
and self-de"ning actions spring from the foreground – for instance, when 
we are facing di%cult decisions or moral dilemmas, when we are trying 
to "gure out what course of action would be best, or when we are con-
sciously re#ecting on our behaviour. But even if the foreground is a real 
and important part of our lives, this does not mean it is the only part. I 
believe experience can show us that most of the time, we are living in the 
background, although the foreground is always on call. In fact, the very 
moment we want to take a closer, more conscious look at things, the shift 
is made, and we are already in the foreground. And this is why we cannot 
trust the kind of active introspection some philosophers endorse. For the 
problem with any variety of [INTROSPECTION 1] is that it is a child of the 
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foreground, and speaks no other language than that of a conscious, willing 
self. Hence, whenever we introspect or ‘retrospect’, any experience that 
usually belongs to the background is drawn into the foreground, and inter-
preted in terms of a one-dimensional self. Of course nothing is wrong with 
this in principle: let all introspect as they please. It is not until philosophers 
start drawing conclusions that things get messy. 
 My thesis is that [INTROSPECTION 1] by nature only interprets the 
foreground, even where there was none – and therefore, that we need an 
alternative along the lines of [INTROSPECTION 2] to get in touch with 
the background, which makes up a more integral part of our everyday 
experience. Here we appear to meet a paradox. For if, as I have suggested, 
the experience of the self is mediated by the re#ective act, how can we 
re#ect on our usual experience without such mediation? How can we use 
introspection to get behind introspection? Perhaps we should accept this 
paradox, since we cannot unravel the Kantian knot: we cannot access our 
experience except through our experience, and we cannot see the self with-
out looking at it. But my claims are more modest than that. My point is 
rather that di$erent ways of introspecting lead to di$erent (and some-
times incompatible) introspective results. Furthermore, I believe the kind 
of mediation that comes with [INTROSPECTION 1] can be avoided to some 
extent by employing the ‘method of stealth’ of [INTROSPECTION 2], as I 
have tried to do in the shower example. 
 !is consists less in active introspection than in a more passive pro-
cedure of monitoring our daily experience, to catch us ‘in the act’ of 
consciousness. One could say that instead of switching on the light and 
shouting ‘freeze!’, we could try to sneak up on ourselves in the dark, and 
thus hope to catch a glimpse of ourselves before the limelight of intro-
spection is on. We cannot completely avoid the focused, deliberate 
introspective gaze, for the light must go on at some point. When it does, 
the phenomenon as it was (an unre#ected embeddedness in the back-
ground) disappears, as the background is irrevocably drawn into the focus 
of the foreground and loses its fuzzy, unfocused character. But traces may 
remain, may be remembered. If nothing else, [INTROSPECTION 2] may 
prove useful in moderating the results produced by [INTROSPECTION 1], 
and supplementing them with its own.15 
Conclusion
Summing up, there is a major risk in trusting any kind of introspec-
tion at face value, and there lies a phenomenological fallacy in relying 
too easily upon ‘phenomenal facts’. At the same time, phenomenology 
cannot go without the "rst-person perspective: any attempt to formu-
late a third-person phenomenology retains an element of naivety, since 
it fails to recognise that third-person descriptions ultimately go back to 
a "rst-person stance. If phenomenology is to survive at all, some kind of 
introspection is required. !e question is, of course, what kind – since the 
chosen ‘method’ of introspection may determine the results. In the context 
of this paper, [INTROSPECTION 2] was used to demonstrate the possible 
de"cits of [INTROSPECTION 1]. !e latter often boasts of possessing an 
unproblematic, commonsensical, prima facie lucidity, yet it remains to be 
seen on a case-by-case basis whether it has enough explanatory power to 
uphold its bold conclusions. !is is why it is healthy at times to use a ver-
sion of [INTROSPECTION 2], to bring us as close to usual experience as 
possible, and at least try to look at it from the background’s point of view. 
 What, then, does this imply for free will philosophers? In my view, 
several do’s and don’ts. First of all, do introspect. And second, do draw the 
background into it. But third, don’t universalise your introspection; and 
fourth, don’t automatically equate it with your usual experience. Fifth and 
"nally, don’t draw too clear a line between the conscious and the noncon-
scious – for there may be a whole realm of experience in between. Perhaps, 
if these lessons are learned, we can question the persistent reductive con-
ception of the will and the self, among proponents of mental causation 
and their critics alike, as something that remains once we have subtracted 
from our behaviour all nonconscious (environ)mental factors that have 
any causal in#uence upon it. !e main question is often considered to be 
whether such a conception makes metaphysical sense, when the real ques-
tion should be whether it makes experiential sense. 
 I do not believe this is how we usually experience our agency, nor our 
identity. We do not just identify with the beam of active, deliberating, 
focused consciousness that is most often projected onto the philosophi-
cal stage. We also identify with the ‘semi-automatic’ stream of thoughts, 
actions and impressions, which are not (fully) conscious to us, but are 
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nevertheless there: the many things in the background that give meaning 
and shape to the foreground, and deserve not to be overlooked. If the self 
consisted only in the truly conscious part, not much would remain of it: it 
would not contain, for instance, the sudden #ashes of insight, inspiration, 
or creativity, which appear to rise from nowhere, yet are so essentially part 
of who we are. Nor the kind and cruel acts we do without thinking, and 
afterwards may cherish, or regret. Such things may not be part of the focal 
point of our experience, but they are part of its horizon. 
 Trying to catch these fragile fragments of experience may take us to 
the limits of language, since we will have to resist the temptation to speak 
of the background in terms of the foreground. As Searle noted (1983: 
157): ‘!e price we pay for deliberately going against ordinary language is 
metaphor, oxymoron, and outright neologism.’ But what we lose in clarity, 
we gain in lifelikeness: for if the talk of backgrounds seems fuzzy, whoever 
said that experience was not?
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Notes
1 Quoted in Bradley (1958: 38).
2 Phenomenology can be de"ned as ‘the study of structures of consciousness as experienced 
from the "rst-person point of view.’ (Smith, 2008: unpaginated). ‘Phenomenology does not 
attempt to speak about things, but only about the way they manifest themselves, and hence 
it tries to describe the nature of appearance as such.’ (Lewis & Staehler, 2010: 1). In the 
context of this paper ‘phenomenological’ designates any attempt to describe consciousness 
and experience from the "rst-person perspective. (See section 2 below.)
3 E.g. claims about experience that pretend to apply to all humans, such as: ‘Everyone 
experiences the world as uni"ed’, or: ‘We all have an experience of conscious will.’
4 !e free will debate may also be construed as a con#ict between determinism and the 
demands of moral responsibility, in which case experiential factors can be (but are not 
always) left out. For a general overview of the free will debate, see for instance Kane (2005).
5 Compatibilists (who believe free will to be compatible with determinism) appear to 
be less committed to a ‘self as source’- phenomenology, and even tend to ‘describe the 
deliberative process more passively, with our decisions “#owing from” our desires and 
beliefs’ (Nahmias et al., 2004: 167) – yet they do sometimes imply the kind of mental 
causation phenomenology that is described by Hohwy above. !ough I will here mainly 
question the self-phenomenology implied by libertarians (who believe determinism to be 
false) and their opponents, this is not to say compatibilists are not at all implicated in my 
criticism below, as it is directed at any kind of unquestioned introspection.
6 A version of this, as phrased by Gertler (2008: unpaginated): ‘Since an appearance of a 
phenomenal quality and the reality which appears (the phenomenal quality itself ) are one 
and the same, on this account, one can enjoy epistemically direct access to the phenomenal 
quality by attending to it.’
7 See for instance Moran (2001: 27-8): ‘[...] the problem of self-knowledge is not set by 
the fact that "rst-person reports are especially good or reliable, but primarily by the fact 
that they involve a distinctive mode of awareness, and that self-consciousness has speci"c 
consequences for the object of awareness.’
8 Note that in this context ‘usually’ does not necessarily imply ‘most of the time’: rather the 
‘usual’ experience of the self signi"es a default mode of consciousness prior to introspection. 
!ough in practice it is possible we are in this default mode most of the time, this is not 
necessarily so. 
9 Moore famously delivered a ‘Proof of an External World’ by means of raising one hand, 
then another, in order to show how an appeal to common sense can solve or dissolve 
philosophical dilemma’s (Moore, 1962: 144-8). Hand-raising examples appear here and 
there in the free will debate, as in Bayne (2006: 176) and, interestingly, in the experimental 
context of Libet 1999, where ‘the sudden #ick of the wrist’ is considered a typical act of will 
(50). See also Wittgenstein (1953/ 2001: no. 621): ‘Let us not forget this: when “I raise my 
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arm”, my arm goes up. And the problem arises: what is left over if I subtract the fact that 
my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?’
10 Note that we can detect two kinds of universalising tendencies in Wegner’s argument: 
not just the universalisation from ‘I’ to ‘we’ as discussed above, but also a universalisation 
from one or a few instances of introspection to a wide range of human experience: from 
‘now’ to ‘most of the time’. Searle seems to do the same in claiming that we experience 
free will ‘all the time’ (1984: 88). !ough my argument is directed against any failure 
to discriminate between experience pre- and post-introspection, this second kind of 
unwarranted universalisation gives it particular urgency.
11 Consider Dennett’s alternative phenomenology of decision-making: ‘[...] decisions can 
also be seen to be strangely out of our control. We have to wait to see how we are going to 
decide something, and when we do decide, our decision bubbles up to consciousness from 
we know not where. We do not witness it being made: we witness its arrival.’ (1984: 78).
12 !is notion of a background to experience is not the same as the background to belief 
as conceptualised by Searle (1983), or the ‘tacit dimension’ of Polanyi (1983), though 
they may be related. Gurwitsch comes close, yet is too static in his division of the ‘"eld 
of consciousness’ into the ‘theme’ or focus of attention, the ‘thematic !eld’ or relevant 
background to the theme, and the irrelevant data in the ‘margin’ (1964: 4). More #exible is 
James’ concept of a ‘psychic overtone, su#usion, or fringe, to designate the in#uence of a faint 
brain-process upon our thought, as it makes it aware of relations and objects but dimly 
perceived’ (1950: 258). Whitehead also speaks of ‘the dim background of our conscious 
experience’ (1947:  122).
13 !ese include things of which you are not really conscious at the moment itself, though 
in retrospect you may realise they were in your awareness. For instance: a neighbour is 
playing some nice classical music. It is not until the music stops that you realise you were 
listening and enjoying it the whole time. It may have been in the background – but it 
was there. One might also think of actions that were not accompanied by a conscious 
intentional stance, though in retrospect one would appropriately ascribe an intention to 
them.
14 Tip-of-the-tongue phenomena are interesting in this context, as they may make us 
aware of an absence or background to experience (Brown, 2002); of ‘a gap that is intensely 
active’ (James, 1890/1950: 251).
15 !ere still seems to be a paradox in the fact that I too am drawing on my own 
introspective experience as a basis for my argument, and I can prove neither that I am 
correctly describing my experience, nor that this description would match the experience 
of others. Again, I accept this paradox, "rstly because I believe it to be unavoidable in 
any phenomenological discussion, and secondly because I do not mean to propose an 
alternative universalistic account of the experience of conscious will. I am trying not to 
generalise, but to de-generalise: to question the results of one common kind of introspection 
by exposing them to a second, more comparative kind. Perhaps my use of introspection 
should likewise be questioned and reconsidered: in fact my argument would encourage 
precisely such a re-examination.
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